Strategy proofness and unanimity in many-to-one matching markets by Diss, Mostapha et al.
MPRA
Munich Personal RePEc Archive
Strategy proofness and unanimity in
many-to-one matching markets
Mostapha Diss and Ahmed Doghmi and Abdelmonaim Tlidi
University of Lyon, Lyon, F-69007, France; CNRS, GATE Lyon
Saint-Etienne, Ecully, F-69130, France; University of Jean Monnet,
Saint-Etienne, F-42000, France., University of Rabat, Mohammadia
School of Engineering, the QSM Laboratory, Avenue Ibn Sina B.P.
765 Agdal, 10100 Rabat, Morocco., University of Marrakech,
National School of Applied Science - Safi, Route Sidi Bouzid B.P.
63, 46000 Safi, Morocco.
8 December 2016
Online at https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/76231/
MPRA Paper No. 76231, posted 25 January 2017 13:46 UTC
Strategy proofness and unanimity in many-to-one
matching markets
Mostapha Dissa, Ahmed Doghmi∗b, and Abdelmonaim Tlidic
aUniversity of Lyon, Lyon, F-69007, France; CNRS, GATE Lyon Saint-Etienne, Ecully,
F-69130, France; University of Jean Monnet, Saint-Etienne, F-42000, France.
bUniversity of Rabat, Mohammadia School of Engineering, the QSM Laboratory, Avenue Ibn
Sina B.P. 765 Agdal, 10100 Rabat, Morocco.
cUniversity of Marrakech, National School of Applied Science - Safi, Route Sidi Bouzid B.P.
63, 46000 Safi, Morocco.
January 23, 2017
Abstract. In this paper, we consider a standard model of many-to-one matching
markets. First, we study the relation between strategy-proofness and unanimity
under a certain requirement and we prove these two properties become equivalent.
Second, we illustrate that this result has an immediate impact on the relation between
strategy-proofness and Maskin monotonicity. Finally, we determine a close connexion
between strategy-proofness and implementation literature. We provide under certain
minimal requirements the foundation for reasoning the equivalence among dominant
strategy implementation, standard Nash implementation, and partially honest Nash
implementation.
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1 Introduction
The matching problems are a branch of public decision problems that have been
extensively analyzed in the literature. They are two principle classes for these problems:
one-side matching markets and two-side matching markets. The first class studies the
assignment of a set of objects with finite capacities to some agents. As examples, we cite
the matching of office spaces to faculty members, the matching of student to dormitories
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etc. The second class, that we are focusing on in this paper, is the one of the most
“popular” classes in matching theory; it explores two sides where each side is assumed to
have strict preferences over the opposite side. Gale and Shapley (1962) might be the first
to study these classes of matching theory. In these environments, stability is considered
as a key property to ensure a such assignment. It is checked if the two properties of
individual rationality and no-blocking are held. Individual rationality requires that each
agent finds her or his match acceptable. The property of no-blocking means that no
agent can improve by breaking up with their current match in order to match up with
each other instead. Gale and Shapley (1962) proved the existence of stable matchings by
providing an algorithm, called the Deferred Acceptance Algorithm, that has been a central
role to design matching programs across several institutions and markets. We distinguish
among three categories: one-to-one, many-to-one, and many-to-many matching problems.
The first category studies the assignment of each agent on one side on the market to at
most one agent on the other side. The best known example for this class is the problem
of marriages where there is a certain community with a set of men and a set of women,
where men only desire women and women only desire men that we would to match.
Each man ranks a set of women in accordance with his preferences for a mariage and vis
versa. For this class of matching, Gale and Shapley (1962) showed that there always is a
stable set of marriages. The second category establishes different examples of matching
problems in real world applications: on one side, colleges admit many student, firms hire
many workers, hospitals employ many interns, and on the other side, student attend one
college, workers work for one firm, and interns work for one hospital. The very known
example is the college admission problem that is introduced by Gale and Shapley (1962).
Each student ranks a set of college in accordance with his preferences for a matching
and each college ranks a set of students with a quota. They proved that a stable college
admissions matching exists. The third category analyses many situations where the very
known example is given by Roth and Sotomayor (1990) who examine the assignment
problem in the market for medical interns in the U.K. .
A solution is a logical process to select a set of matching outcomes. By solutions we
generally indicate matching rules which differ according some desirable properties. As
examples of matching rules: the stable rule, the Pareto rule, and the individually rational
rule.
Although the basic models of two side matching problems are based on the notion
of stability, many works in the matching literature are concerned with the question of
the strategic behavior of agents. Generally, in most cases of public decision problems,
agents have private information about their own preferences and they do not provide them
exactly. So that agents reveal truthfully their preferences, a central planner should find
mechanisms which give agents the incentive to reveal truthfully their private information
independently of the other agents’ behavior; the one of the most frequently mechanism
used in the recent literature in social choice theory is known as strategy-proofness.
This property is widely studied in the previous literature as long as it obligates the
institutions to reveal truthfully their preferences. It requires that no agent can manipulate
the outcomes of social choice rule in his favor by misrepresenting his preferences. It
constitutes a key property for the fundamental result in social choice theory, which is
known as the Gibbard (1973)-Satterthwaite (1975) Theorem. This result shows that if
there exist at least three alternatives and individual preferences are not restricted, then
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every strategy-proof social choice rule is dictatorial.
In relation with matching problems, many authors studied the relation between
strategy-proofness and efficiency. In one-to-one matching markets, Roth (1982) provided
an impossibility result by showing that there is no stable and strategy-proof mechanism.
Alcade and Barbera` (1994) proved that there is no solution that is Pareto efficient,
individually rational and strategy-proof. In many-to-one matching problems, So¨nmez
(1996a) axiomatized matching rule and he proved that there is a rule that is Pareto
efficient, individually rational, and strategy-proof, which selects the unique stable
matching, if and only if the capacities are unlimited.
In this paper, we deal with many-to-one matching problems. As solutions, we focus
in particular on all sub-solutions of stable rule. Differently to the previous studies
that often relate the axiomatization of strategy-proofness with Pareto efficiency and
individual rationality1, in this study we introduce the property of unanimity as a principle
requirement to masure efficiency. This intuitive property is very attractive and checked
by many solutions in the literature. We first provide a close connexion between strategy-
proofness and unanimity. Second, we use a part of the first connexion to determine the
relation between strategy-proofness and Maskin monotonicity. Alike connexion is given
recently but in a different topic by Diss et al. (2016) who explored the relation between
strategy-proofness, unanimity and Maskin monotonicity in a domain of single-peaked
preferences with private values. Their results provided a connexion with implementation
literature where these properties are central.
In our context and in relation with implementation theory, we show that there is a
close connexion with strategy-proofness and the implementability of the sub- solution
of the stable correspondence in dominant strategies equilibria and in Nash equilibria.
Before exposing our contribution in this direction, we start by giving a brief review of
implementation theory in matching problems. In these domains, many authors have
tried to apply a certain existing theoretical results to implement the stable SCCs in
various models. In the class of one-to-one matching models that include both marriage
problems (Gale and Shapley,1962) and housing markets (Shapley and Scarf, 1974),
So¨nmez (1996b) used the results of Danilov (1992) and Yamato (1992) that are based
on a strong version of Maskin monotonicity. He proved that the solution of nonempty
core is Nash implementable with at least three agents. In one-to-one and many-to-
one matching problems, Kara and So¨nmez (1996,1997) applied the results of Maskin
(1977,1999), Danilov (1992), and Yamato (1992). They examined the implementability
of certain examples of the stable matching SCCs. Haake and Klaus (2009) considered a
general class of many-to-one matching rules in studying a class of matching with contracts
markets (Hatfield and Milgrom, 2005). To extend the result of Tadenuma and Toda (1998)
from pure one-to-one matching rules to general many-to-one matching rules, Korpela
(2013) referred to a general variant of Maskin monotonicity developed in Korpela (2010)
and provided a full characterization for Nash implementation. In this topic, Doghmi and
Ziad (2015) have recently provided a full characterization based only on the property of
Maskin monotonicity.
Although several authors are interested to Nash implementability of stable rules in
matching problems, they are few works that examined the implementability of these rules
1See for example Schummer (1997) and Hashimoto (2008) in the domain of exchange economies.
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in dominant strategy equilibria. For instance, Kumano and Watabe (2012) studied the
implementability of the deferred acceptance algorithm, but on one-side matching markets,
where priorities objects cannot be private information and in using a direct mechanism.
They provided a full characterization based on strategy-proofness. In this paper we
study two-sided matching markets in which both preferences of workers and firms are
private information and prove that it is possible to implement the stable correspondence
in both dominant strategy equilibria and Nash equilibria by indirect mechanism. Hence,
we bridge the gap between Nash implementation and dominant strategy implementation.
We introduce a new condition and we prove that strategy-proofness is not only a necessary
property in general environments as known in the literature, but also becomes sufficient
for a sub-solution of the stable matching correspondence to be implementable with
at least three agents and at least three matchings when the requirement of citizen
sovereignty is fulfilled. In standard Nash implementation, strategy-proofness provides
a full characterization without any restriction on the number of matchings. However,
in partially honest Nash implementation, all sub-solutions of the stable matching
correspondences are implementable independently to strategy-proofness. From these
results we obtain a certain equivalence among these theories.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows: In Section 2, we introduce notations
and definitions. In Section 3, we state and prove our main result. In sections 4, we study
the relation between strategy-proofness and implementation literature. In Section 6, we
conclude.
2 Model and definitions
Let F = {f1, ..., fn} be the set of Firms. Let W = {w1, ..., wm} be the set of workers.
Let q = (qf1 , ..., qfn) be a vector of positive natural numbers, where qfi is the capacity
of firm fi ∈ F . Let R = (Ri)i∈F∪W be a list of preferences of firms and workers. The
asymmetrical and symmetrical parts of Ri are denoted respectively by Pi and ∼i.
In this model, we assume that the indifferences are not allowed as in Korpela’s model
(2013). We consider the case where F , W and q are fixed. The four-tuple (F ,W , q, R)
constitute a many-to-one matching labor market.
The preference relation Rw of worker w ∈ W is a linear order on the set F ∪ {∅},
where ∅ is interpreted as w not being matched with any f ∈ F . Let Lw be the class of
all such preference relations for worker w ∈ W . The preference relation Rf of firm f ∈ F
is a linear order on the setWf = {G | G ⊆ W and | G |≤ qf}, where ∅ is also interpreted
as w not being matched with any f ∈ F . As Roth (1985); Kara and So¨nmez (1996), we
assume that Rf is responsive for all f ∈ F . That is, for all G ⊆ W such that | G |< qf ,
the following two properties are checked:
1) For all w,w′ ∈ W \G,G ∪ {w}PfG ∪ {w′} if, and only if wPfw′. 2
2) For all w ∈ W \G,G ∪ {w}PfG if, and only if wPf∅.
Let Lf be the class of all such preferences for firm f ∈ F . Let L = L nf ×L mw . We
define the choice H of a firm f from a group of workers G ⊆ W under the preference
Rf as follows: Hf (G;Rf ) = {G′ ⊆ G :| G′ |≤ qf , G′RfG′′ for all G′′ ⊆ G such that
| G′′ |≤ qf}.
2We write w instead of {w}.
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A many-to-one matching µ is a mapping from the set F ∪W into 2F∪W such that:
For all w ∈ W , | µ(w) |≤ 1 and µ(w) ⊆ F ;
For all f ∈ F , | µ(f) |≤ qf and µ(f) ⊆ W ;
For all (f, w) ∈ F ×W , µ(w) = f if and only if w ∈ µ(f).
For any i ∈ F ∪W , we call µ(i) the assignment of i under µ. We denote the set of all
possible matchings by M. We extend the preference relation Rf of a firm f ∈ F from
the class of subsets 2W∪{∅} to the set of matching M as follows: f prefers the matching
µ to the matching µ′ if and only if it prefers its assignment under µ to its assignment
under µ′. Similarly, we extend the preference relation for a worker and we use Rf and
Rw to denote this extension.
A matching µ is blocked by a worker w ∈ W under a preference profile R if
∅Rwµ(w). A matching µ is blocked by a firm f ∈ F under a preference profile R if
µ(f) 6= Hf (µ(f);Rf ). Under responsive preferences, this statement is equivalent to the
following: A matching µ is blocked by a firm f ∈ F under a preference profile R if there
is a worker w ∈ µ(f) such that ∅Rfw.
A matching µ is individually rational under a preference profile R if it is not blocked
by a worker or a firm under R; i.e., if µ(w)Pw∅ for all w ∈ W and µ(f) = Hf (µ(f);Rf )
for all f ∈ F .
A matching µ is blocked by a firm-worker pair (f, w) ∈ F × W under a preference
profile R if (i) fPwµ(w), and (ii) wPfw
′ for some w′ ∈ µ(f), or wPf∅ if | µ(f) |< qf .
A matching µ is stable under a preference profile R if it is both individually rational
and not blocked by any firm-worker pair.
We denote the set of all stable matchings under R by S(R). The stable many-to-one
matching rule is a correspondence ψ : L →M such that ψ(R) = S(R) for all R ∈ L . A
sub-solution of the stable many-to-one matching rule is any correspondence ϕ : L →M
such that ϕ(R) ⊆ S(R) for all R ∈ L . Gale and Shapley (1962) showed that a many-
to-one matching problem has at least one stable matching for any admissible preference
profile.
We denote by L(µ,Ri) = {ν ∈ M | µRiν} the lower contour set for agent i at
matching µ for all Ri ∈ <i and all µ ∈ M. The strict lower contour set is denoted by
LS(µ,Ri) = {ν ∈M | µPiν}.
Now, we formally define the notion of strategy-proofness, which is the key property in
this paper. It requires that no agent can benefit from misrepresenting his true preferences.
Definition 1 (Strategy-proofness)
A sub-solution to the stable matching correspondence ϕ satisfies the strategy-proofness
property if for all R ∈ <, all i ∈ F ∪W, and all R′i ∈ <i, ϕ(R)Piϕ(R′i, R−i).
The second fundamental property is unanimity. It means that if for all preference
profile, a matching is top-ranked for all agents, then this matching must be chosen.
Formally, it is defined as follows.
Definition 2 (Unanimity) The unanimity property states that if for all profile R ∈ <,
for all i ∈ F ∪W and for all matching ν ∈M for which L(ν,Ri) =M, then ν ∈ ϕ(R).
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3 Main result
According to Doghmi and Ziad (2015), the property of unanimity is checked by all sub-
solution to the stable matching correspondence as shows the following proposition.
Proposition 1 (Doghmi and Ziad 2015) Any sub-solution to the stable matching
correspondence ϕ : L →M satisfies unanimity.
Next, we use the following condition.
Condition 1. Let ϕ be a sub-solution to the stable matching correspondence. Let
R ∈ L , µ, ν ∈ M, i ∈ F ∪W , and ν ∈ ϕ(R), if ν ∈ LS(µ,Ri), there exists R ∈ L such
that µ ∈ ϕ(R), and L(ν,Rj) =M for all j ∈ F ∪W .
This condition means that if in a first profile R, a socially chosen matching ν is strictly
dominated by a matching µ for an agent i , then there exists a new profile R, in which
the matching µ is chosen by the society, and ν improves her ranking and becomes top-
ranked for all agents. It has been recently introduced by Diss and al. (2016) to study
the relation between strategy proofness and unanimity in fair allocation problems with
single-peaked preferences. It is checked by all solutions satisfying the requirements of
citizen sovereignty3 and external stability 4 in the problems of fair allocation.
In our context of many-to-one matching markets, we refer to the result of Roth (1982)5
and we provide the following example: let ϕ : L → M be a sub-solution to the stable
matching correspondence which associates the set of weakly Pareto efficient outcomes Pw
in M with a preference profile R defined as follows: ϕPw(R) = {µ ∈ M : @µ′ ∈ M such
that µ′Piµ for all i ∈ F ∪W}.
We show that ϕPw satisfies Condition 1. Assume not, i.e., for ϕPw(R) ⊆ S(R) for all
R ∈ L , µ, ν ∈ M, i ∈ F ∪W , and ν ∈ ϕPw(R), we have ν ∈ LS(µ,Ri) (1), but for all
R ∈ L we have either (a) µ /∈ ϕPw(R), or (b) L(ν,Rj) 6= M for some j ∈ F ∪W . For
statement (a), µ /∈ ϕPw(R) for all R ∈ L means that there exists µ′ ∈M such that µ′P iµ
for all i ∈ F ∪W . Since statement (a) is verified for all R ∈ L , then we have for R, µ′Piµ
for all i ∈ F ∪W . Hence, from (1) we obtain µ′Piν for some i ∈ F ∪W . If µ′ = ∅, then ν
can not be individually rational, and so it can not be stable, a contradiction. In all other
cases, there is a pair (f, w) ∈ F ×W such that w ∈ µ′(f) and f ∈ µ′(w), and we have:
(i) for some f ∈ µ′(w), fPwν(w) and (ii) for some w ∈ µ′(f), wPfw′ for some w′ ∈ ν(f)
or wPf∅ if | ν(f) |< qf . Therefore, ν is blocked by a firm-worker pair (f, w) ∈ F ×W
under R, and so it is not stable, a contradiction. For statement (b), we have for all
R ∈ L , L(ν,Rj) 6=M for some j ∈ F ∪W . This means that there exists µ′′ ∈ M such
that µ′′Pjν for some j ∈ F∪W , and hence we follow the same reasoning of statement (a).
3A sub-solution to the stable matching correspondence ϕ : L →M satisfies the property of citizen
sovereignty if for each µ ∈M, there is a profile R ∈ L such that µ ∈ ϕ(R).
4An SCF f(R) ⊆ X is externally stable under R if every allocation in X \f(R) is dominated by f(R).
5Roth (1982) proved that if a matching is an agent-optimal stable, then it is weakly Pareto optimal.
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In the following proposition, we prove that if Condition 1 holds, the property of
strategy-proofness is satisfied.
Proposition 2 If Condition 1 holds, any sub-solution to the stable matching correspondence
ϕ : L →M satisfies strategy-proofness.
Proof. Assume not. Therefore, there exists R and R′i such that ϕ(R
′
i, R−i)Piϕ(R).
Let ν ∈ ϕ(R) and µ ∈ ϕ(R′i, R−i). Hence, ν ∈ LS(µ,Ri) (1). By Condition 1, there
exists R ∈ L such that µ ∈ ϕ(R), and L(ν,Rj) = M for all j ∈ F ∪ W (2). From
Proposition 1, ϕ satisfies unanimity, and hence ν ∈ ϕ(R). Therefore, ϕ(R) = {µ, ν}.
From (2), stability, and strictness we have µ = ν,6 which contradicts (1). Q.E.D
From Propositions 1 and 2 we give the following first main result in this paper.
Theorem 1 If Condition 1 holds, a sub-solution to the stable matching correspondence
ϕ : L →M satisfies unanimity if and only if ϕ is strategy-proof.
The second property that has a close connexion with strategy-proofness is Maskin
monotonicity. It means that if a matching µ is socially chosen in a profile R and if the
matchings ranked below µ for all agents remain ranked below it (in a large sense) in a
new profile R′, then the matching µ must be socially chosen in R′.
Definition 3 (Maskin monotonicity)
A sub-solution to the stable matching correspondence ϕ : L → M satisfies Maskin
monotonicity if for all R,R′ ∈ L , for any µ ∈ ϕ(R), if for any i ∈ F ∪W, L(µ,Ri) ⊆
L(µ,R′i), then µ ∈ ϕ(R′).
If strategy-proofness is known as the key necessary condition in the literature of
dominant strategy implementation, Maskin monotonicity plays a fundamental role for
Nash implementation. According to Maskin (1999), any Nash implementable social choice
rules must satisfies the property of monotonicity. Studying the link between the two
properties allow us to inspect the relation between dominant strategy implementation
and Nash implementation. We return to this relationship for more details in Section 3.
From Proposition 2, it is obvious that Maskin monotonicity implies strategy-proofness.
Hence, to prove the converse implication, we once again use Condition 1. We show that,
under this property, strategy-proofness implies Maskin monotonicity.7
6From (2), stability, and strictness we necessarily have µ = ν on F ∪ W, i.e., µ(j) = ν(j) for all
j ∈ (F ∪W). Assume not, i.e., there exists j ∈ (F ∪W) such that µ(j) 6= ν(j). As L(ν,Rj) =M and
the individual preferences are strict, we have ν(j)P jµ(j). If ν(j) = ∅, then µ can not be individually
rational, and so it can not be stable. In all other cases, there is a pair (f, w) ∈ F×W such that w ∈ ν(f)
and f ∈ ν(w), and we have: (i) for some f ∈ ν(w), fPwµ(w) and (ii) for some w ∈ ν(f), wP fw′ for
some w′ ∈ µ(f) or wP f∅ if | µ(f) |< qf . Therefore, µ is blocked by a firm-worker pair (f, w) ∈ F ×W
under R, and so it is not stable, a contradiction.
7For more details on the literature that examined the relation between strategy-proofness and Maskin
monotonicity in other domains, see Muller and Satterthwaite (1977), Bochet and Storcken (2010), and
Klaus and Bochet (2013).
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Proposition 3 If Condition 1 holds, any sub-solution to the stable matching correspondence
ϕ : L →M satisfies strategy-proofness is Maskin monotonic.
Proof. Assume that a sub-solution to the stable matching correspondence ϕ : L →M
satisfies strategy-proofness, but not Maskin monotonicity. Then, for any R,R′ ∈ L , any
µ ∈ ϕ(R), and any i ∈ F∪W , L(µ,Ri) ⊆ L(µ,R′i) (1), but µ /∈ ϕ(R′) (2). Since ϕ satisfies
strategy-proofness, then for all R ∈ L , all i ∈ F∪W , and all R′i ∈ Li, ϕ(R)Piϕ(R′i, R−i).
Let ν ∈ ϕ(R′i, R−i), hence µRiν (3). From Proposition 1, ϕ is unanimous. Hence, by (2),
µ /∈ ϕ(R′) implies that there exist i ∈ F ∪W and ω ∈M such that ωP ′iµ and by (1) we
have ωPiµ, and hence by (3), ωPiν (4). By Condition 1, there exists R ∈ L such that
w ∈ ϕ(R), and L(ν,Rj) =M for all j ∈ F ∪W (5). By unanimity, ν ∈ ϕ(R), and hence
ϕ(R) = {w, ν}. From (5), stability, and strictness we have w = ν,8 which contradicts (4).
Q.E.D
From Propositions 2 and 3 we complete the proof of the second main result in this
paper.
Theorem 2 If Condition 1 holds, a sub-solution to the stable matching correspondence
ϕ : L →M satisfies Maskin monotonicity if and only if ϕ is strategy-proof.
4 Connexion with implementation literature
A sub-solution to the stable matching correspondence ϕ : L →M represents the welfare
for a society in providing desired outcomes for a social designer. To implement this sub-
solution, the social designer does not know exact preferences that are private information
of the agents on the assignments. Hence, she/he organizes a non-cooperative game (game
form) among agents. This procedure is a pair Γ = (S, g) with S = S1 × ... × Sn and
g : S → X. For each agent i ∈ F ∪ W , Si is agent i’s strategy space, and g is the
outcome function that associates an outcome with each profile of strategies. A game
form (mechanism) Γ = (S, g) implements ϕ : L →M in a set of solution concepts SC
if for all R ∈ L , ϕ(R) = g(SC(S, g, R)). We say that ϕ is implementable in a solution
concept if there is a mechanism which implements it.
4.1 Strategy-proofness and dominant strategies implementation
In general environment, strategy-proofness is known as a necessary condition for
dominant strategies implementation. It becomes necessary and sufficient together with
an additional property, termed weak-non-bossiness, introduced recently by Saijo and al.
(2007). This full characterization is based on a restricting class of mechanisms and on
single-valued rules. In this subsection, we use an indirect mechanism rather than direct
mechanism to characterize multi-valued-rules. We prove that strategy-proofness becomes
also sufficient under Condition 1. As we illustrate in the next, this result is based on the
connexion between strategy-proofness and Maskin monotonicity, proved in the above,
and on the finding of Yao and Yi (2007).
8To prove this, we follow the same statement in Proposition 2.
8
Let dominant strategy equilibrium be a solution concept of the game (Γ, R). The set of
dominant strategy equilibria at state R is denoted by DSE(S, g, R) and the set of strategy
dominant equilibria outcomes is g(DSE(S, g, R)). A mechanism Γ = (S, g) implements
ϕ : L →M in dominant strategy equilibria if for all R ∈ L , ϕ(R) = g(DSE(S, g, R)).
Next, we define the strict version of Maskin monotonicity developed by Yao and Yi
(2007) that we call Y -monotonicity. This condition is formally defined as follows:
Definition 4 (Y -monotonicity)
A sub-solution to the stable matching correspondence ϕ : L → M satisfies Y -
monotonicity if for all R,R′ ∈ L , for any µ ∈ ϕ(R), if for any i ∈ F ∪ W,
L(µ,Ri) \ {µ} ⊆ LS(µ,R′i), then ϕ(R′) = {µ}.
In other terms, Y -monotonicity means that if a matching µ is socially chosen in a
profile R and if the matchings ranked below µ for all agents, in excluding µ, become
strictly ranked below it in a new profile R′, then the matching µ must be alone socially
chosen in R′.
Now, we present a strong variant of the requirement of citizen sovereignty provided
in Yao and Yi (2007).
Definition 5 (Citizen sovereignty)
A sub-solution to the stable matching correspondence ϕ : L →M satisfies the property
of citizen sovereignty if for each µ ∈M, there is a profile R ∈ L such that ϕ(R) = {µ}.
This property requires that every possible ranking of matchings can be achieved from
an individual preference outcome.
Corollary 1 (Yao and Yi (2007)) Let | M |≥ 3. If the property of citizen sovereignty
holds, then a sub-solution to the stable matching correspondence ϕ : L → M is
implementable in dominant strategies if and only if it satisfies Maskin monotonicity and
Y -monotonicity.
Proposition 4 In many-to-one matching markets, Y -monotonicity becomes equivalent
to Maskin monotonicity.
Proof. Let R,R′ ∈ L , µ ∈ M, and µ ∈ ϕ(R) ⊆ S(R). i) Y -monotonicity
implies Maskin monotonicity; this first implication is immediate from the inclusions
L(µ,Ri) \ {µ} ⊆ L(µ,Ri) and LS(µ,R′i) ⊆ L(µ,R′i). ii) Maskin monotonicity implies
Y -monotonicity; in this case, assume that L(µ,Ri)\{µ} ⊆ LS(µ,R′i). From this, we have
L(µ,Ri) = L(µ,Ri) \ {µ}∪{µ} ⊆ LS(µ,R′i)∪{µ}. Since LS(µ,R′i)∪{µ} ⊆ L(µ,R′i), we
obtain L(µ,Ri) ⊆ L(µ,R′i) for all i ∈ F ∪W (∗). By Maskin monotonicity, µ ∈ ϕ(R′).
Now we show that ϕ(R′) = {µ}. Assume that there is µ′ ∈ ϕ(R′), we want to show that
µ(i) = µ′(i) for all i ∈ F∪W . Assume not, i.e., there is j ∈ F∪W such that µ(j) 6= µ′(j).
By strictness of preferences we have either (1) µ(j)P ′jµ
′(j) or (2) µ′(j)P ′jµ(j). For case
(1), if µ(j) = ∅, then µ′ can not be individually rational, and so it can not be stable.
In all other cases, there is a pair (f, w) ∈ F × W such that w ∈ µ(f) and f ∈ µ(w),
and we have: (i) for some f ∈ µ(w), fP ′wµ′(w) and (ii) for some w ∈ µ(f), wP ′fw′ for
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some w′ ∈ µ′(f) or wP ′f∅ if | µ′(f) |< qf . Therefore, µ′ is blocked by a firm-worker pair
(f, w) ∈ F ×W under R′, and so it is not stable, a contradiction. For case (2), we have
from (∗), µ′(j)Pjµ(j). If µ′(j) = ∅, then µ can not be individually rational, and so it can
not be stable, a contradiction. In all other cases, there is a pair (f, w) ∈ F×W such that
w ∈ µ′(f) and f ∈ µ′(w), and we have: (i) for some f ∈ µ′(w), fPwµ(w) and (ii) for some
w ∈ µ′(f), wPfw′ for some w′ ∈ µ(f) or wPf∅ if | µ(f) |< qf . Therefore, µ is blocked by
a firm-worker pair (f, w) ∈ F×W under R, and so it is not stable, a contradiction. Q.E.D
From Corollary 1 of Yao and Yi (2007) and Proposition 5 in this paper we complete
the proof of the the following theorem.
Theorem 3 Let | M |≥ 3. If the property of citizen sovereignty holds, then a sub-
solution to the stable matching correspondence ϕ : L →M is implementable in dominant
strategies if and only if it satisfies Maskin monotonicity.
From Theorems 2 and 3 we give the following result.
Corollary 2 Let n ≥ 3 and | M |≥ 3. If Condition 1 and the requirement of citizen
sovereignty hold, then a sub-solution to the stable matching correspondence ϕ : L →M
is implementable in dominant strategies if and only if it satisfies strategy-proofness.
4.2 Strategy-proofness and Nash implementation with standards
agents
In this subsection we provide a full characterization to implement a sub-solution of the
stable matching correspondence in Nash equilibria. Differently to the previous literature,
we use the property of strategy-proofness as an alternative requirement. We shows that
strategy-proofness is not only a necessary and sufficient condition for dominant strategy
implementation, but it provide a full characterization for Nash implementation in this
environment. This shows that both theories are very near each other in this domain.
Let R ∈ L a profile of preferences, and let Nash equilibrium be a solution concept of
the game (Γ, R). The set of Nash equilibria at state R is denoted by NE(S, g, R) and the
set of Nash equilibria outcomes is g(NE(S, g, R)). A mechanism Γ = (S, g) implements
a sub-solution of the stable matching correspondence ϕ : L → M in Nash equilibria if
for all R ∈ L , ϕ(R) = g(NE(S, g, R)).
To illustrate the connection between Nash implementability and strategy-proofness of
a sub-solution of the stable matching correspondence, we appeal to the result of Doghmi
and Ziad (2015).
Corollary 3 (Doghmi and Ziad (2015)) Let n ≥ 3. A sub-solution of the stable
matching correspondence ϕ : L → M is Nash implementable if and only if it satisfies
Maskin monotonicity.
From Theorem 2 and Corollary 4 we give the connexion between strategy-proofness
and Nash implementation with standards agents.
Corollary 4 Let n ≥ 3. If Condition 1 and the requirement of citizen sovereignty hold,
a sub-solution of the stable matching correspondence ϕ : L →M is Nash implementable
if and only if it satisfies strategy-proofness.
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4.3 Strategy-proofness and Nash implementation with partially
honest agents
Here, we present an environment of partial honest agents. We consider the same well-
known model as the one considered in Dutta and Sen (2012), and Doghmi and Ziad
(2013), Kartik et al. (2014), Korpela (2014), Saporiti (2014), Doghmi (2015), Ortner
(2015), and Hagiwara et al.(2016) among others. More precisely, we assume that there
are some players who have a “small” intrinsic preference for honesty and each honest
individual expresses her preferences in a lexicographic way. For a domain of single-peaked
preferences L , let Ci be the other components of the strategy space (which depends on
individual preferences, social states, . . . ). The set Si = L × Ci represents the strategy
profiles for a player i ∈ F ∪W and S = S1 × ... × Sn is a set of strategy profiles. The
elements of S are denoted by s = (s1, ..., sn). A domain is a set D ⊂ L . For each
i ∈ F ∪W , and R ∈ D , let τi(R) = {R} × Ci be the set of truthful messages of agent i.
We denote by si ∈ τi(R) a truthful strategy as player i is reporting the true preference
profile. We extend a player’s ordering over the set X to an ordering over strategy space
S. This is because, the players’ preference between being honest and dishonest depends
on strategies that the others played and the outcomes which they obtain. Let Ri be the
preference of player i over S in preference profile R. The asymmetrical and symmetrical
parts of Ri are denoted respectively by Ri and ∼Ri . Let Γ be a mechanism (game form)
represented by the pair (S, g), where Si = D × Ci and g : S → A is a payoff function.
Definition 6 A player i is partially honest if for all preference profile R ∈ D and
(si, s−i), (s′i, s−i) ∈ S,
(i) When g(si, s−i)Rig(s′i, s−i) and si ∈ τi(R), s′i /∈ τi(R), then (si, s−i) Ri (s′i, s−i).
(ii) In all other cases, (si, s−i) Ri (s′i, s−i) iff g(si, s−i)Rig(s′i, s−i).
Let NE(g,R, S) be the set of Nash equilibria of the game (Γ,R). A mechanism
Γ = (S, g) implements a sub-solution to the stable matching correspondence ϕ : D →M
in Nash equilibria if for all R ∈ D , ϕ(R) = g(NE(g,R, S)). We say that ϕ is partially
honest implementable in Nash equilibria if there is a mechanism which implements it in
these equilibria. In this framework, we recall the Assumption A of Dutta and Sen (2012).
Assumption 1 There exists at least one partially honest individual and this fact is known
to the planner. However, the identity of this individual is not known to her.
Next, we define a weak variant of no-veto power.
Definition 7 (Strict-weak no-veto power)
A sub-solution to the stable matching correspondence ϕ : D → M satisfies strict-weak
no-veto power if for each i ∈ F ∪W, each R ∈ D , each µ ∈ ϕ(R), and each ν ∈ M, if
for R′ ∈ D , ν ∈ LS(µ,Ri) ⊆ L(ν,R′i) and L(M, R′j) =M for all j ∈ (F ∪W)\{i}, then
ν ∈ ϕ(R′).
Doghmi and Ziad (2012, 2013) showed that the properties of strict-weak no-veto power
and unanimity are sufficient for a social choice correspondence to be partially honest Nash
implementable.
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Theorem 4 (Doghmi and Ziad (2012, 2013)) Let n ≥ 3 and suppose Assumption
A holds. If a sub-solution to the stable matching correspondence ϕ : D → M satisfies
strict-weak no-veto power and unanimity, then ϕ can be implemented in Nash equilibria.
According to Doghmi and Ziad (2015), the property of strict-weak no-veto power is
automatically checked for all sub-solution to the stable matching correspondence.
Proposition 5 (Doghmi and Ziad 2015) Any sub-solution to the stable matching
correspondence ϕ : D →M satisfies strict-weak no-veto power.
It follows from Theorem 3 and Propositions 1 and 6 that any sub-solution to the
stable matching correspondence can be implemented Nash equilibria in an environment
of partial honesty.
Corollary 5 Let n ≥ 3 and suppose Assumption A holds. Any sub-solution to the stable
matching correspondence ϕ : D →M is partially honest Nash implementable.
We remark that the partial honest Nash implementability of a sub-solution to the
stable matching correspondence is checked independently to the property of strategy-
proofness.
4.4 Equivalence results
Condition 1 and the property of citizen sovereignty allow us to capture the equivalence
between dominant strategy implementation, standard Nash implementation, and partially
honest Nash implementation. We deduce this from the corollaries 4, 6, and 7.
Corollary 6 Let n ≥ 3 and | M |≥ 3. If Condition 1 and the requirement of citizen
sovereignty hold, then dominant strategy implementation, standard Nash implementation,
and partially honest Nash implementation are equivalent.
This equivalence result can be related to the recent development in implementation
literature concerning secure implementation with standard agents provided in Saijo and
al. (2007) and Mizukami and Wakayama (2016), and the one with partially honest agents
developed in Saporiti (2014). Since secure implementation is a double implementation in
Nash equilibria and in dominant strategy equilibria, Corollary 6 extends the equivalence
of implementability to this concept of secure implementability.
5 Conclusion
In this paper we have inspected the relation between strategy-proofness and unanimity.
We have first, introduced a new condition and we have proved that these properties
become equivalent if this new requirement is met. We have second, showed that this
result help us to detect the link between strategy-proofness and Maskin monotonicity.
These results allowed us to determine a certain connexion between strategy-proofness
and implementation literature. In particular, we have proved that dominant strategy
implementation, standard Nash implementation, and partially honest Nash implementation
are equivalent under our new requirement.
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